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Abstract
The Globe Distribution Network (GDN) is an application for the efficient, worldwide distri-
bution of freely redistributable software packages. Distribution is made efficient by encapsulating
the software into special distributed objects which efficiently replicate themselves near to the
downloading clients. The Globe Distribution Network takes a novel, optimistic approach to stop
the illegal distribution of copyrighted and illicit material via the network. Instead of having mod-
erators check the software archives at upload time, illegal content is removed and its uploader’s
access to the network permanently revoked only when the content is discovered. An important
feature of the GDN is that the distributed objects containing the software can run on untrustwor-
thy servers. By exploiting the replication of the software and using fault-tolerant server software,
the Globe Distribution Network achieves high availability. A first version of the GDN has been
implemented and has been running since October 2000 across four European sites. This article
describes the design and implementation of the GDN.
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INTRODUCTION
Developing a large Internet application is a difficult task due to the complex nonfunctional aspects that
have to be taken into account. A developer has to deal with a potentially large number of users, high
communication delays, security threats, and machine and network failures. The key to making large-
scale application development easier is therefore providing the developer with the means for dealing
with these complex aspects. Current middleware platforms, such as CORBA and DCOM, however,
do not provide adequate support in this area, as they are mainly aimed at local area networks. We are
designing and building a new middleware platform that will provide the developer with the support
needed to build worldwide distributed applications more easily. This middleware platform is called
Globe [1]. To demonstrate the feasibility of our ideas and the design of the Globe middleware we
have been building a new large-scale Internet application, called the Globe Distribution Network.
This article describes the design and implementation of this application.
The Globe Distribution Network, or GDN for short, is an application for the efficient, world-
wide distribution of freely redistributable software packages, such as the GNU C compiler, the GIMP
graphics package, Linux distributions, and shareware. Efficiency is achieved by efficiently replicating
the software near to the users. The GDN does not require servers hosting replicas to be trustworthy.
The server capacity required to host the replicas of the software can therefore be donated by untrusted
volunteers. To protect these volunteers against legal action the GDN takes special measures to pre-
vent the distribution of illicit content. The GDN has high availability and well-defined semantics when
failures can no longer be masked.
We chose the distribution of freely redistributable software (henceforth free software) as an ex-
ample application for a number of reasons. The most important reason is that the application itself
has many interesting aspects. Many people are interested in free software, and many people are cre-
ating free software, resulting in an application that is large both in terms of numbers of users and in
the amount of data that needs to be handled. The application also has interesting security aspects.
Unauthorized modification of the software being distributed must be impossible and neither should
malicious persons be able to use the GDN to illegally distribute copyrighted or illicit material. What
makes the security aspects particularly interesting is our intention to let the GDN use spare server ca-
pacity provided by anyone who wishes to contribute, implying that the majority of machines used are
not to be trusted. This design goal also makes making the application fault tolerant more challenging.
A second reason for choosing software distribution is that the current Internet applications for
distributing information are in need of an update. FTP and HTTP have proven to scale quite well,
but replication and security have been added onto, instead of integrated into the applications. As a
result, a lot of things in particular with respect to replication still have to be done by the user. These
include finding out which mirror sites exist, dealing with site failures and handling inconsistencies
between mirrors (caused by the periodic pull model applied in many mirroring solutions). The Globe
Distribution Network provides an integrated solution where failures only very rarely require human
intervention.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. We start with a description of the basic
architecture of the Globe Distribution Network and provide the necessary background on the Globe
middleware platform. This description will explain the basic operation of the application. The next
two sections present our security and fault tolerance measures, respectively. We then continue with
a description of our current implementation and conclude with future enhancements to the design
presented here.
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Figure 1: The basic architecture of the Globe Distribution Network (squares represent processes,
ovals represent (distributed) services, arrows represent communication). Clients download software
packages from a collection of object servers. Being a Globe application, the GDN depends on the three
standard Globe middleware services: the Globe Naming Service (GNS), the Globe Location Service
(GLS) and the Globe Infrastructure Directory Service (GIDS). The GDN Network Information Service
(GDN NIS) is a GDN-specific service handling key distribution and validation.
ARCHITECTURE
The architecture of the Globe Distribution Network is shown in Figure 1. The core of the Globe
Distribution Network is formed by a collection of Globe object servers. A Globe object server is a
user-level process that stores and manages replicas of a subset of the software packages being dis-
tributed through the GDN.
What is special about the Globe Distribution Network is that the replication of software pack-
ages is not handled by the object servers directly. Instead, software packages are encapsulated in
Globe’s distributed shared objects (DSOs) which manage the replication and location of their state
(the software package) and all other nonfunctional aspects themselves [1].
Clients downloading software from the GDN connect to the most convenient (e.g. geographically
nearest) object server that holds a replica of the object containing the desired software package. To find
this most convenient replica, clients perform a two-step lookup process. In the first step, the symbolic
name of the software-package object is resolved to a binary object handle. The object handle of a
software-package object is its permanent identifier that does not change during the lifetime of the
object. This resolution step is carried out by the Globe Naming Service (GNS) [2].
In the second step, the object handle of the package object is mapped to the contact address of its
nearest replica. This contact address contains, among other items, the IP address of the object server
running the replica. We have developed a special service for mapping the location-independent object
handles to the actual replica locations, called the Globe Location Service (GLS) [3]. The special
property of this service is that its lookup costs are proportional to the distance between client and
replica. So, if a replica is located near the client, lookup costs are low. Using the information in the
contact address the client constructs a proxy for the software-package object and uses this to retrieve
the software from the object.
Software-package objects replicate themselves over the object servers following current client de-
mand and the history of the object. This object-controlled automated replica management not only
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makes things easier for the publisher of a software package, but also allows faster and effective re-
sponse to sudden increases in popularity. When the popularity of a certain software package suddenly
rises (e.g., there is a new version and everybody wants to download it) the software-package object
locates additional object servers and requests them to create a new replica. The additional object
servers are located using the Globe Infrastructure Directory Service (GIDS) which keeps track of the
object servers available worldwide [4]. When popularity drops and it becomes inefficient to maintain
a replica at a certain object server the object removes the replica and deregisters it from the Location
Service.
Before we go into how software packages are encapsulated in Globe distributed shared objects we
first describe how these automatically replicating distributed objects are actually implemented.
Globe’s distributed-object model
The fundamental idea underlying the Globe middleware is that a distributed object should have com-
plete control over its (distributed) implementation. In Globe a distributed object manages all its non-
functional aspects, such as transport of method invocations, location and replication of its state, and
security itself, using only a minimum of supporting services [1]. We call this model of distributed
objects the distributed shared object (DSO) model. Focusing on the management of the replication
of the state, having control over one’s implementation means, concretely, that proxies and replicas
of a Globe distributed object contain all code for doing replication and (group) communication in an
object-specific way.
A replica of a Globe distributed shared object typically consist of 4 modules, or subobjects as we
call them, as illustrated in Figure 2. The replication subobject (labeled R in the figure) contains the
implementation of the replication protocol used by this object. The communication subobject (Co in
the figure) satisfies the replication subobject’s communication needs, for example, by offering reliable
group communication primitives. The semantics subobject, labeled S in the figure, contains the actual
implementation of the object’s methods and logically holds the state of the object. As illustrated in the
figure, the state may actually be stored on local storage, but this fact is transparent to the other sub-
objects. The control subobject (labeled Ct) manages the interaction between the replication protocol
and the object implementation and bridges the gap between the application-defined interfaces of the
semantics subobject and the standardized interface of the replication subobject. Proxies of distributed
shared objects have a similar modular structure. A typical proxy consists of only a communication, a
control and a replication subobject.
The replication subobject is the component that monitors client traffic. When subobject detects
that a lot of clients are located in a particular geographical region and determines that it is more
efficient to create a replica there, it contacts the Globe Infrastructure Directory Service to find object
servers to create new replicas on. This process of network-load balancing is described in detail in
[5]. The current Globe implementation does not support server load-balancing, but we expect that
well-known techniques to do this will be incorporated in the future.
When a new replica or proxy is created, its subobjects are loaded dynamically into an object
server or client, respectively, from a trusted implementation repository, comparable to automatic class
loading in Java. In the case of a proxy and for all but the initial replica, the information detailing which
subobjects to load is contained in the contact address which the process obtains from the Location
Service in the two-step lookup process described in the previous section.
The modularization of the code and standardization of subobject interfaces, combined with dy-
namic loading not only allows us to easily select different replication protocols for different distributed
objects, but also allows the introduction of new replication protocols without changing the object
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Figure 2: Three object servers each hosting a replica of a Globe distributed shared object. Each replica
consists of four so-called subobjects, labeled Ct, R, S, and Co.
servers. In our current design of the Globe Distribution Network we use a single replication proto-
col that is compatible with our security requirements. We come back to this aspect in the section on
security.
Mapping software packages to Globe objects
The actual mapping from software package to DSOs involves a number of issues we have not yet
discussed. To explain the details of the mapping we first introduce some terminology.
A software package in our approach is an application, a library, or any piece of software that is
published as a separately named entity. We assume that a software package may continuously evolve
as bugs are fixed, new functionality is added, or when it is adapted to changing library APIs. This
evolution results in a tree of revisions, that is, versions that are meant to replace other, earlier versions.
Each revision of a package can have a number of variants, that is, versions somehow derived from
a revision that are not meant to replace it, but instead coexist with that revision [6]. An example
of variants is formed by compiled binaries for different platforms. However, a revision can also have
multiple source-code variants specifically targeted towards a particular platform when the code cannot
be or is intentionally (e.g. for performance reasons) not made platform independent.
The mapping of a software package to distributed shared objects is as follows. We encapsulate
each revision of a software package along with all its variants in a single DSO. We refer to such a
distributed shared object as a revision object. A variant may be distributed in multiple file formats,
either a generic file archive format (ZIP, GZIP-ed TAR) or a specialized format for packaging software,
such as Red Hat’s RPM [7] or Debian’s DEB format [8]. In other words, a revision object is basically
a collection of archive files, containing the different variants of a particular revision of a software
package.
Consider the following example to illustrate our mapping scheme. The GIMP application ma-
nipulates images in various image formats. In the Globe Distribution Network the package would be
published as a set of revision objects, one for each published revision. The revision object encapsu-
lating revision 1.1.29, for example, would consist of the source code in tar.gz format and binaries
for Linux on i386 and Alpha processors in .deb and .rpm package formats.
We chose this mapping because it allows us to apply different replication strategies to different
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revisions. Popular new revisions can be replicated on many hosts, while older revisions of a software
package need to be replicated on just a few archive sites. This approach allows for efficient use of
the available resources. We may switch to an alternative mapping where each individual variant is
encapsulated in a separate DSO in the future, if our initial mapping turns out to be too coarse-grained.
Uploading into or downloading an archive file from a revision object is done by invoking the
methods of the distributed shared object. To upload a file a user first calls the startFileAddition
method passing the name and size of the file to be uploaded as arguments. The content of the file is
uploaded in large blocks using a series of invocations of the putFileContentmethod. When the
upload is finished the user calls endFileAdditionwhich finalizes the upload and makes the file
accessible for download. The archive files are written to persistent storage by the semantics subobject.
Downloading is also done in large blocks using the getFileContentmethod.
Having explained the basic operation of the Globe Distribution Network we now discuss its se-
curity design and how it is made fault tolerant. We focus on the GDN application; security and fault
tolerance of the supporting, application-independent services such as the Globe Location Service are
not discussed here, see, for example, [9]. For the remainder of this article these services are therefore
assumed to be fault tolerant and run by a trusted organization on trusted hosts.
SECURITY
The security design of the Globe Distribution Network addresses three issues:
1. How to guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the software being distributed.
2. How to prevent the illegal distribution of copyrighted works or illicit material via the GDN.
3. How to guarantee the availability of the GDN given our design goal to allow object servers to run
on untrusted machines. This design goal enables anyone with a permanent Internet connection
to run an object server and participate in the GDN. Measures must be taken to prevent attackers
from disrupting the GDN by running maliciously modified object servers.
We discuss the issues of authenticity and integrity, content liability, and availability in turn.
Authenticity and integrity of the software
People downloading software from the Globe Distribution Network want to be assured of the authen-
ticity and integrity of the software downloaded; that is, is the package that they just downloaded the
actual GIMP application or a malicious Trojan horse?
In our design, establishing the authenticity of software is the responsibility of the downloading
user. In principle, the GDN guarantees only the integrity of the distributed software. It gives only
very limited authenticity guarantees, by providing the verified name of the person who uploaded
the software (which is recorded for traceability reasons, as we explain later). Stronger guarantees
concerning the authenticity of software should therefore come from mechanisms outside the GDN.
The GDN does, however, provide hooks for such external verification.
Currently, free software distributed via HTTP or FTP is authenticated using public-key cryp-
tography [10]. Maintainers of software packages digitally sign the archive files with a private key
and publish the associated public key on the well-known Web site of the software package (e.g.
www.kernel.org for the Linux kernel). People that download the software obtain the public key
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from the well-known Web site and use it to check the digital signature, thus establishing the authentic-
ity of the software. We refer to this signature as the end-to-end signature. Vital to this authentication
scheme is that the associated public key is obtained from a trustworthy source that guarantees that the
key actually belongs to the maintainer of the package. Note that even though Web sites currently do
not meet this requirement they are nonetheless used for this purpose in practice.
The GDN supports only the automatic verification of end-to-end signatures. The GDN makes it the
responsibility of the downloading user to obtain the proper public key. Concretely, when downloading
a file from the GDN the end-to-end signature is downloaded along with it. The GDN client software
then does the end-to-end authenticity check, using a key ring supplied by the downloading user. If the
key ring does not contain the required public key, the user is prompted to supply it. People can, of
course, choose to do end-to-end signature verification themselves (using, for example, PGP [11]) if
they do not trust the GDN client software to do this faithfully.
Most important reason for not having the GDN provide strong authenticity guarantees is that we
expect GDN users not to trust any statements the GDN makes about the authenticity of the software
they download. We expect GDN users will want to verify themselves that the software they down-
loaded and which they will be running on their systems is what they expect it to be. Furthermore, it
is also difficult for a distribution network such as the GDN to provide strong authenticity guarantees.
Consider the following example. To guarantee that the revision object named “GIMP 1.1.29” actually
contains revision 1.1.29 of the GIMP application we would have to establish who is the maintainer of
GIMP and make sure that only that person can create a revision object named “GIMP 1.1.29” in the
GDN and can upload files into that object. Making sure only a certain person can use certain names
and edit certain objects is relatively easy, but establishing who is the maintainer of a specific package
is, in general, rather difficult.
Content liability
We must take action to prevent the illegal distribution of copyrighted works or illicit content via
the GDN so that the owner’s of object servers do not run the risk of being prosecuted for copyright
infringement or the distribution of illicit material. In some countries, in particular in the United
States, the computer owner himself is liable for copyright infringement if copyrighted content is served
from his computer even if the owner did not place it there [12]. The same risk of liability exists for
pornography and other illicit materials.
Avoiding the problem of liability by ensuring that no illegal content is uploaded into the Globe
Distribution Network is practically impossible. The only solution is to manually check each piece of
content before it is allowed onto the network. Manual checks are error prone and may be defeated
by cleverly encoding illicit content into inconspicuous content. We can, therefore, try only to limit
distribution of illegal content.
We believe that manual checks at upload time are an unsuitable mechanism for limiting the amount
of illegal distribution. Manual checks at upload time, or content moderation as we refer to it, has sev-
eral disadvantages. Unpacking software archives and checking them for illicit content is tedious work.
In addition, if there is little abuse, we expect the people doing the moderation to perceive the work
as superfluous. Moreover, content moderation introduces a delay between the initial submission for
publication and the actual publication in the distribution network. We expect that software maintainers
wanting to publish via the GDN will find this delay irritating.
Given the disadvantages of content moderation we chose a different, novel solution to limit the
illegal distribution of content in the Globe Distribution Network. All content that is published through
the GDN is made traceable to the person who published it. If it is discovered that a person published
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inappropriate content through the GDN all content published by that person is immediately removed
and he or she is banned from the GDN. Intuitively, the GDN is similar to a world-writable directory
on a UNIX operating system: everybody can place files in the directory but the files always remain
traceable to the user that put them there because of the associated ownership information.
Implementing content traceability
Content traceability is implemented in the GDN as follows. If someone wants to start publishing
the software he maintains via the GDN he has to contact one of the so-called Access-Granting Or-
ganizations. An Access-Granting Organization, or AGO for short, verifies the candidate’s identity
by checking his passport or other means of identification. In addition, the organization checks with
the other AGOs to see if this person has not been banned from the GDN. If the candidate is clean,
the Access-Granting Organization creates a certificate [10] linking the identity of the candidate to a
candidate-supplied public key and digitally signs this certificate. This certificate allows the candidate
to upload content into the GDN. We call a person who is allowed to upload content a GDN producer.
We call the key pair of which the public key on this certificate is one part the trace key pair. The trace
key pair may be the same key pair as used for the end-to-end signature but this is not required.
A producer signs all content that he uploads into the GDN using the trace key pair. We call this the
trace signature to distinguish it from the end-to-end signature. Concretely, the startFileAddi-
tionmethod invoked at the beginning of an upload has two additional arguments: a digital signature
created with the trace private key, and the certificate containing the trace public key signed by the
Access-Granting Organization. The trace signature is created automatically by the GDN upload tool.
When the upload is finished and the producer calls endFileAddition the object verifies the trace
signature. When the signature is false (either because the producer has been banned from the GDN,
the certificate did not contain the right public key, or the file did not match the digital signature) the
object removes the uploaded file from its state. This procedure guarantees that all content in the GDN
is traceable to a particular producer.
Object-server owners can decide which producers they want to give access to their object servers
by specifying which AGOs they trust to do a proper identity and black-list check. Only producers
that have certificates signed by those AGOs will be allowed to place content on the object server.
Object-server owners can also block individual producers.
Revoking access to the GDN
To ban a producer from the GDN when illicit content traceable to him is found, the following proce-
dure is executed. When a downloading user or object-server owner finds illicit content in the GDN
he contacts a GDN producer who will make the accusation on his behalf. The accusing producer
notifies all object-server owners and the Access-Granting Organization that gave the violator access
of the presence of illicit content. The Access-Granting Organization in addition receives a copy of the
signed illicit content and verifies that this content is indeed inappropriate and signed by the violator.
If this is the case, the violator is then placed on the central black list shared by all AGOs and is thus
banned from the GDN.
The actions taken by the object-server owners depend on their policy. They may destroy their
replicas of all objects that contain content signed by the violator, or delete the replicas of only the
objects mentioned in the allegation. They may do so immediately upon notification by the accusing
producer, or only after the allegation has been verified by the AGO. Object-server owners can also
decide not to remove the content but instead temporarily block accused producers from their server.
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What policy object-server owners will adopt depends on the requirements imposed by the law,
the level of abuse and whether or not people report the abuse. In principle, object-server owners
are autonomous and can decide for themselves which policy they adopt. However, the GDN may
also impose a system-wide policy to guarantee certain system-wide properties with respect to illegal
distribution. We currently require object servers to follow a system-wide policy where all content
published by a violator is deleted, but only after verification of the evidence.
The reason accusation is delegated to a producer is to keep the number of accusations an AGO
has to process low. More specifically, the accusing producer will be banned himself if the accusation
he makes proves false. The system-wide policy provides protection against malicious GDN producers
trying to remove well-known software packages from the GDN.
Discussion
This scheme for handling the problem of illegal distribution of copyrighted or illicit content is in line
with current legal developments. For example, in the United States, “provider[s] of online services”,
such as Internet Service Providers can request legal protection from copyright infringements by their
users. Under this protective measure, copyright holders cannot seek compensation from the service
providers for these infringements. To receive this legal protection ISPs are required only to remove
the copyrighted content once they have been notified by the copyright holders [12].
The correct operation of the GDN’s scheme for limiting illegal distribution depends on two fac-
tors: (1) the goodwill of the GDN producers and (2) the correct functioning of the Access-Granting
Organizations. In theory, the scheme works even if the majority of Internet users want to abuse the
GDN for illegal distribution. Eventually all abusers will have been black listed and only truthful peo-
ple will have access. However, by the time we have reached this situation no person with truthful
intentions will be making object servers available anymore. This scheme therefore practically de-
pends on the goodwill of the GDN producers. Given that their good name is at stake (the black list of
GDN abusers is public), we expect most GDN producers will behave.
The scheme itself provides some protection against misbehaving Access-Granting Organizations.
When a truthful Access-Granting Organization mistakenly gives a previously blocked producer access
again, an object server ends up serving illicit content. However, as before, this illicit content will
be removed immediately and its uploader blocked when it is detected. When an Access-Granting
Organization (purposely or not) does not respond to accusations of abuse by producers it gave access
to or (purposely) gives blocked producers access again, the AGO will get a bad reputation. Object-
server owners will start refusing any producers the AGO accredited and eventually the AGO will
ousted from the GDN.
What this scheme currently does not fully take into account are the differences between countries
of what content may be legally distributed. Moreover, the GDN also does not currently provide mea-
sures to prevent people in a country with strict laws from downloading illegal content from countries
where this content is legal. These issues require further investigation. In the meantime, we define our
own policy of what can be distributed via the GDN. Given that the GDN is to be used for the distribu-
tion of free software, we define inappropriate as anything that is not freely redistributable software or
part thereof.
Ensuring the availability of the Globe Distribution Network
The GDN should have high availability; that is, it must be up and running most of the time. Two
factors influence availability: deliberate attacks on the GDN, which we discuss here, and failures,
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discussed in next section.
Recall that our design goal is to make anyone with a permanent Internet connection a candidate for
running an object server for the GDN. This design goal creates a vulnerability as people may attempt
to undermine the availability of the GDN from the inside by running a modified and maliciously
acting object server. We, as GDN designers, do not have and can never have complete control over
object-server machines and thus cannot prevent this malicious behavior. We, therefore, take measures
which to make sure these denial of service attacks have little effect.
We divide our discussion on countermeasures into two parts. We first discuss measures that protect
against malicious object servers trying to affect the operation of other object servers. After that, we
discuss the measures that protect a downloading user against a misbehaving object server. We do not
consider denial-of-service attacks by network flooding.
Protecting object servers
Object servers can maliciously affect other object servers by sending fake replication-protocol mes-
sages. In particular, they can send fake state-update messages (i.e., method invocations, a new version
of the state, and state invalidates) and sabotage collective decisions, for example, by reporting failure
in a two-phase commit protocol or faking replies from other object servers during such decisions.
Our first measure for protecting good object servers is to have all revision objects use a safe
replication protocol. In this replication protocol each object has a small number of so-called core
replicas. These replicas run on machines trusted by the owner of the object (a GDN producer) and
have access to the producer’s trace private key (or a derivative thereof [13]). In addition to these core
replicas, an object can have a number of replicas hosted by untrusted machines. Untrusted and core
replicas accept only state-update messages that are signed with the producer’s trace private key. Given
that only the producer and the core replicas have access to this key, no untrusted replica (i.e., malicious
object server) can modify the state of any other replicas.
The second measure is to limit the number of collective decisions, as we illustrate with the fol-
lowing two examples. When a state-modifying method, for example, deleteFile is invoked, only
the core replicas dictate whether or not this update operation succeeds. As a consequence, when all
core replicas have successfully executed a state-modifying method, but an untrusted replica cannot
perform the update for whatever reason, the operation on the object is never rolled back. Instead, the
untrusted replica is no longer considered a part of the object and is left to destroy itself.
Another example of limiting collective decisions relates to replica placement. We make each
untrusted replica decide for itself if there is a need for a new replica and where it should be placed.
In some cases better decisions could be made by taking the load and geographic location of more
replicas into consideration, but that requires replicas not to sabotage this collective decision.
Not all cooperation between untrusted object servers can be avoided, however, so there can still
be some interference from malicious object servers. For example, when an object server detects an
influx of traffic from a particular region it will ask an object server in that region to create a new
replica. The latter (malicious) object server could grant the request, but kill the new replica just after,
thus hindering the former object server. We provide some limited means to deal with these types of
situations. Object-server owners are allowed to specify which object servers they want to cooperate
with and can block others (e.g. by blocking certain IP-address ranges). These rules are used in
selecting a candidate object server (using the Globe Infrastructure Directory Service) and to evaluate
“create replica” requests the object server receives itself.
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Protecting downloading users
It is important to realize that an object server can be only obnoxious to a downloading user since
any malicious modifications to the software are detected by the end-to-end authenticity and integrity
checks discussed in the previous section.
One source of interference with normal operation is fake contact addresses in the Globe Location
Service (GLS). Object servers need to register the replicas they host in the GLS such that downloading
clients can find them. Object servers should, however, not be able to insert fake addresses. We
implement this requirement as follows. Object servers are not allowed to register a contact address
for a certain Globe object, unless they can present the GLS-access ticket for this object to the GLS.
A GLS-access ticket is basically the object handle of the object signed by the GDN producer that
created the object and is given to each object server in the “create replica” request. So to register
a fake address an object server must first have been asked to create a replica of the object by one
of the existing replicas, limiting the possibility of malicious object servers inserting fake addresses
considerably.
Even if object servers have been asked to create a replica of a certain object they can still hinder
a downloading user by putting different content in that replica. This content could even be traceable
(i.e., a malicious object server could serve us the content of a totally different object) which means
that users will not notice the problem until they do the end-to-end authenticity check. This problem
makes the end-to-end authenticity check absolutely vital to the secure downloading of software from
the GDN. Again, by allowing users to black-list object servers in their client software or to specify
preferences (e.g. preferably connect to object servers from the .edu domain) we give users a way to
also protect themselves against this type of misbehavior.
FAULT TOLERANCE
The Globe Distribution Network should be able to handle failures of hosts and networks. More con-
cretely, we want the GDN to:
1. be highly available; that is, it must be up and running most of the time.
2. exhibit failure semantics by which an operation on the GDN is a transaction, and either gives
a complete and correct response or otherwise reverts back to the state before the operation and
reports an error.
Having the GDN meet the second requirement makes it easier to use. If someone tries to upload a
new version of a software package and the upload fails, he does not have to worry about some object
servers keeping a partial copy.
To make the Globe Distribution Network highly available we make use of the fact that the software
packages are replicated to make their distribution efficient. Because object servers do not have to be
trusted we expect there will be no shortage of object servers. We can therefore safely assume that
all software packages will have more than one replica. This assumption allows us to transparently
fail-over to another replica in most failure situations and thus provide uninterrupted service.
In our safe replication protocol some replicas have a special status, however, as we saw in the
previous section. In particular, our safe replication protocol depends on the presence of at least one
trusted core replica that assists in the creation of other replicas on other, untrusted machines, and
which controls updates. To ensure availability of this central component we require a revision object
to have multiple core replicas. We do not expect a shortage of trusted object-server capacity since these
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servers have to be trusted only by the maintainer of a particular software package. Given that different
maintainers will trust different machines, we expect a natural distribution of trust and therefore core
replicas over the collection of available object servers.
We benefit not only from the replication of the software packages, but also from the fact that
software packages are stored persistently on local storage by the replica’s semantics subobject (see
above). By also making the internal state of the replica and administration of an object server persis-
tent we can create a highly available object server. When an object server suffers from a nonhalting
crash, it can restore the replicas of the revision objects it was hosting and thus quickly resume service,
increasing availability.
Making operations on the Globe Distribution Network transactional, in particular uploads, is more
complex. We discuss the two most important operations on the GDN, downloads and uploads, in turn.
Making downloads transactional is easy. In most cases a download will be successful given that
the download tool can fail-over to other replicas. There are two cases where a download may need to
be rolled back: when all replicas have become unavailable and when the download tool itself crashes.
In both cases rollback is simple because revision objects do not keep track of the state of a download
(i.e., which parts of the files have been downloaded by the client). Rolling back the operation therefore
only involves deleting the incomplete file from the downloading user’s disk. This can be done by the
download tool, immediately or when it is restarted.
As a convenience to the GDN user we take special measures to allow a user to continue a download
after a crash of his download tool or temporary unavailability of the revision object, as follows. We
assume that after a crash the user will restart the tool and have it continue the download. The download
procedure is now as follows. The GDN download tool starts a download by retrieving the desired file’s
trace signature from the revision object and storing it on disk. If the tool crashes during this step, its
reincarnation simply downloads the trace signature again. Next, the tool starts downloading the file
from the object in blocks. When the tool or the machine it is running on crashes at this point, the
reincarnation reads the trace signature from the local disk. The trace signature contains a checksum,
allowing the tool to detect if the signature has been damaged. Using this signature, the tool checks if
any of the already downloaded blocks of the file were damaged during the crash and, if so, downloads
these damaged blocks again.
To enable this behavior, our trace signatures are special signatures that can be used to check
the integrity of the whole file but also of its individual blocks. In particular, a trace signature is
a record consisting of the cryptographic digests [10] of the individual blocks and a cryptographic
digest of the whole file encrypted with the producer’s trace private key (required for traceability).
The download tool can now detect any damage on the blocks by first decrypting the trace signature
using the producer’s trace public key and then recalculating the digest of each downloaded block and
comparing it to the block’s digest in the trace signature.
After the integrity checks on the downloaded data, the tool resumes the download at the point
where its previous incarnation crashed. The final step in the download procedure is verification of
the complete file and downloading the end-to-end signature, both of which can be repeated after a
nonhalting crash.
Creating transactional uploads is very complex. Source of the complexity is the fact that uploads
into the GDN consist of multiple method invocations (we upload files in blocks, as described above).
The Globe middleware currently lacks support for transactionally executing a series of method invo-
cations, therefore we have to resort to an ad hoc solution. We choose a solution where the uploading
user is responsible for the rollback, making uploads a nontransactional operation. However, this solu-
tion strives to make the upload succeed whenever possible. We consider developing a proper rollback
mechanism outside the scope of this research and given we expect the number of uploads into an
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object to be low, we consider the current solution sufficient for now.
Our solution is as follows. We distinguish three types of failures that can happen during an upload:
crash failure of a replica (halting or nonhalting), noncrash-failure of a replica (e.g. out of disk space)
and crash failure of the upload tool. To handle the first type of failure, when a replica, either core
or untrusted, crashes during the upload it is pronounced dead and no longer considered part of the
object even if the object server recovers. When all core replicas fail, this is detected by the remaining
untrusted replicas which destroy themselves thereby destroying the object.
To handle the second type (noncrash-replica failures) we take two measures. The first measure is
to reserve the required disk space at the start of the upload. As explained above, to prevent clients
from seeing a partially uploaded file, uploads of a file start and end with special method invocations
(i.e., startFileAddition and endFileAddition). By having the startFileAddition
method reserve the required disk space we reduce the chance of an upload failing half-way through.
The second measure to deal with noncrash-replica failures is to adopt the following update strat-
egy, implemented as part of our safe replication protocol. All write-method invocations are first sent
to the core replicas. The core replicas forward the invocation to all untrusted replicas and also carry
out the method themselves. Every untrusted replica that fails to execute the method destroys itself.
As for the core replicas, each one reports the result (failure or success) of the method execution to
its peers. When at least one core replica reports success, the core replicas that failed to execute the
method destroy themselves. Core-replica failures are reported to the upload tool along with the results
of the method invocation.
This procedure results in a successful upload if at least one of the core replicas succeeds in carrying
out all the method invocations. The only case where these measures are not sufficient is when all core
replicas fail to execute the method. In this case, the core replicas instruct the remaining untrusted
replicas to destroy themselves. The core replicas will not destruct themselves, instead they report a
failure of the method invocation to the upload tool. It now is the responsibility of the uploading user
to rollback the upload by deleting the partially uploaded file from the revision object.
This is the same rollback an uploading user will have to perform to recover from the third type of
failure we distinguish: a crash of the upload tool. We take no extra measures to handle this type of
failure.
Apart from problems that directly influence the correct functioning of the Globe Distribution Net-
work there are a number of problems caused by failures that merely affect the performance of the
GDN. In particular, failures of object servers can cause the Globe Location Service and Globe Infras-
tructure Directory Service to be out of sync with the actual situation. These problems are performance
problems, because, for example, a downloading client fails over to another replica if the first one does
respond quickly and an object server will ask for another candidate object server if it does not get a
reply to its “create replica” request.
When considering the Location Service, inconsistencies are avoided by having object servers that
suffered nonhalting crashes bring the Service in sync again when they reboot by deregistering the
contact addresses of replicas that could not be recovered. Halting crashes are dealt with by having
object servers periodically register contact addresses again. Periodical reregistration is also used to
fix inconsistencies in the Infrastructure Directory Service.
CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION
A first version of the Globe Distribution Network has been up and running since October 2000. It cur-
rently spans four European sites: the Vrije Universiteit and the NLNet Foundation in the Netherlands,
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INRIA Rocquencourt in France and the University of Erlangen in Germany. We expect to include a
site in the United States soon. All code is written in the Java programming language. Since a large
part of the functionality of the Globe Distribution Network comes from the Globe middleware we
start with the implementation status of the middleware and discuss the status of the GDN application
thereafter.
The Globe middleware services
The Globe Naming Service as found in the current Globe middleware is a prototype version based
on the Domain Name System (DNS) [14] and works as follows [15]. Globe object names have
a one-to-one mapping to valid DNS names. These DNS names point to a TXT DNS Resource
Record that contains the encoded object handle for the DSO. To map a Globe object name, say
/nl/vu/cs/globe/somePackage, to a Globe object handle, the object name is first translated
to a DNS name, in this case somePackage.globe.cs.vu.nl. This DNS name is then re-
solved using the normal DNS name resolution mechanism and returns a TXT record from which the
object handle is extracted.
In the current implementation of the Globe Distribution Network software maintainers there-
fore have to setup their own DNS leaf domain to register Globe object names or contact another
maintainer willing to make registrations for them. We have setup a specific DNS domain called
software.gns-dns.globeworld.org where we register names on request. This domain is
subdivided into categories to allow object names such as /org/globeworld/gns-dns/soft-
ware/os/Linux/kernel/v2-2-18. We do not check if the person making the request is actu-
ally the maintainer of the package, because that is very hard to establish as we discussed in the section
on authenticity of the distributed software. Therefore, downloading users must retrieve the object-
name-to-package binding from a trusted source, for example, the package’s well-known Web site.
We intend to replace the DNS-based prototype with an implementation based on distributed shared
objects [2] in the future.
The basic functionality of the Globe Location Service, that is, mapping location-independent ob-
ject handles to contact addresses in a scalable way has been completely implemented. This imple-
mentation is described in full detail in [16].
The Globe Infrastructure Directory Service (GIDS) has been implemented but not yet integrated
into Globe. It uses the Light-weight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and standard LDAP servers
[17]. The GIDS divides the world into a set of base regions. Per base region there is an LDAP
server, called the Regional Service Directory that keeps track of the available object servers and their
properties (such as amount of memory and disk space available, required authentication method, etc.).
The base regions are organized into a hierarchy, currently based on their geographical location, which
allows clients (i.e., objects looking to create a new replica somewhere) in other base regions to locate
the appropriate Regional Service Directories [4].
The Globe object server
The Globe object server is the Globe middleware’s application-independent platform for running repli-
cas of distributed shared objects. It is currently implemented as single user-level process and consists
of three components: the server manager, the persistence manager and the communication-object
manager. The server manager controls the operation of the object server and processes the object-
management commands the server receives over the network, such as “create replica” and “destroy
replica.” The communication-object manager and the persistence manager are resource managers.
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The persistence manager provides an operating-system independent interface to the persistent stor-
age of the host machine. Replicas that need large amounts of storage such as our revision objects
use this interface to store and retrieve their state. The persistence manager keeps track of the per-
sistent resources a replica uses such that when a replica crashes it can free those resources. The
communication-object manager manages the communication resources of an object server. In partic-
ular, the communication-object manager provides transparent multiplexing of communication streams
to the same hosts, reducing the number of TCP connections required.
A Globe object server provides facilities for replicas to survive the graceful shutdown and restart
of a server. When an object server is shutdown by its owner it signals this fact to the running replicas.
Based on their own (object-specific) policy, the replicas then decide to stay or remove themselves from
the object server. When a replica decides to stay it marshalls its internal state (which includes the state
of the object) and writes it to persistent storage using the persistence manager. The server manager
records which replicas are staying and need to be restored after rebooting and stores this information
in a persistent log. When the object server restarts it reads this log and recreates the replicas which
then, in turn, recreate their internal state from disk and contact their peers to check for missed updates.
Special measures are in place to make sure the network contact points (i.e., TCP port numbers) of the
replicas remain the same. If these contact points would change after a reboot the contact addresses
for these replicas in the Globe Location Service would have to be updated. By making sure the same
contact points are used again the impact of a reboot is minimized.
The Globe Distribution Network
The current implementation of the Globe Distribution Network supports the basic functionality for
uploads and downloads and replication. The security and fault tolerance measures described have not
yet been incorporated. The implementation consists the code for the revisions objects that encapsulate
the software, an upload tool and a HTTP-to-Globe gateway used for downloading software via a
standard Web browser.
The code of the revision object consists of a semantics subobject and a replication subobject. The
GDN semantics subobject implements the block-based interface for uploading and downloading files
into a revision object, described earlier. It interfaces with the persistence manager of its host object
server to read and write the archive files that make up the revision object’s state to disk. The replication
subobject implements a master/slave replication protocol that can handle distributed shared objects
with very large state. It does not yet support any of the security and fault tolerance features discussed
above. The upload tool can be used to upload files into a revision object and for manually managing
the replication of a revision object. We do not currently have support for automatic replication.
The HTTP-to-Globe gateway enables the downloading of software packages via a standard Web
browser. This gateway works as follows. We use special URLs that have encoded in them the name of
a revision object and the name of the desired archive file (e.g. source.tar.gz) in that object. The
HTTP-to-Globe gateway extracts the object name from the URL and resolves it to a contact address
using the two-step lookup process involving the Globe Naming Service and the Globe Location Ser-
vice. Using this contact address the gateway constructs a proxy of the desired revision object. It then
repeatedly invokes the method getFileContent on the revision object to retrieve the contents of
the desired archive file. The contents of the file are passed to the requesting browser which saves them
to disk.
We have started implementing the security and fault tolerance measures described in this article
and expect to finish their implementation by the end of 2001.
14
CONCLUSIONS
The Globe Distribution Network (GDN) is an application for the efficient distribution of freely re-
distributable software packages. It has been developed as a test application for a new middleware
platform called Globe which is designed to facilitate the development of large-scale Internet appli-
cations. Distribution of the free software is made efficient by encapsulating the software into Globe
distributed shared objects and having efficiently replicating the objects near to the clients download-
ing the software. Replication of the software is automated because distributed shared objects manage
their replication themselves based on past and present client demand. An important feature of the
Globe Distribution Network is that it can use untrusted servers to replicate the software objects on.
Instead of doing content moderation at upload time to prevent the illegal distribution of copy-
righted material or other illicit content, the Globe Distribution Network takes a novel approach where
publishers are given direct access to the network. In this optimistic approach all content uploaded
into the network is made traceable to its publisher (by means of digital signatures) allowing illicit
material to be removed from the GDN immediately after it is found and the publisher of this material
to be banned from the GDN. The Globe Distribution Network exploits the replication of the software
to achieve high availability and has well-defined failure semantics when failures can no longer be
masked.
Our experiences with the current implementation of the GDN in a test spanning four European
sites are promising. We are currently working on a more complete implementation of the described
design and intend to expand our experiments to involve more sites, in particular in the United States. In
the mid-term future we plan to add support for facilitating the management of many different versions
of a software package and downloading groups of related packages. The source code for both the
Globe Distribution Network and the Globe middleware platform are freely available under the BSD
software license [18].
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